Sawiris first
Column Sometimes communication even works provided it is handled honestly, writes Karl Lüönd.
Column Sometimes communication even works, provided it is handled honestly.
Thomas Matter has lost many millions and his future prospects because he was so sophisticated in business that he did everything wrong in the eyes of the public. Unfortunately, in the context of public opinion, it doesn't matter what any investigation will show one day. And if they would clear him - a stain would remain. The verdict of public opinion (a tortuous term!) knows no possibility of appeal. It is best to do everything right from the beginning. Hopefully Martin Bisang will also get the idea. The only difference between him and Matter is: Matter has already done it.Samih Sawiris, on the other hand, is someone who seems to do everything right. Sawiris is the Egyptian who is going to build the big leisure village in Andermatt. An Egyptian in Switzerland, in these times - that doesn't look like a success story in a country where SVP zealots are already fighting against virtual minarets. All it takes is one wrong move and one devious opponent, and the boy wonder plummets from the top into the bottomless pit, and the value of his company dwindles irrevocably by tens of millions. In the Swissfirst case, it was possible to observe how much the "soft factors" matter today when you have to represent or explain something in public: openness, credibility, plausibility, flexibility. And sensitivity in dealing with dissenters.
The clever Egyptian who wants to invest in the Urseren Valley is, of course, in a more comfortable position than Swissfirst boss Thomas Matter. He doesn't have to defend himself, he's not under fire. But a few other differences are worth noting. Of course, Sawiris also has his high-profile advisors (here, Franz Egle of www.konsulenten.ch., among others). But whenever it becomes important, Sawiris comes himself. He doesn't hide behind any spokesmen, he answers questions personally and in impeccable German, he is tangible and questionable. That makes what he says binding and credible.
Secondly, the man is agile and open for all his single-mindedness. Pro Natura humming in the corner? No problem - I understand! Come, let's sit together. The farmers who should cede land hesitate? Sorry, I understand, we must have gone too fast, sorry! We slow down our schedule and gain three months for additional clarifications.
From this follows, thirdly: The man does not only talk nicely, he also acts accordingly. Fourthly, he may have read a book that has hardly become known beyond the circle of specialist historians, but which is of the greatest importance in the current context*. It describes the history of the Urserenwerk project. Sixty years ago, the same ground in Andermatt was to be submerged for the sake of the electrical industry. And the foreign promoters of the project took a completely different approach. With the corresponding consequences: "We don't negotiate! We do not sell! We don't go!". The resistance of the people of Uri against this large-scale project of the electrical industry was uncompromising and so militant that it culminated in violence against commissioned land buyers and in the well-known Uri riot. It was a full-blown riot with a subsequent trial.
The project for the largest hydroelectric power plant in the Alps had all the technical and energy advantages, but it had one major disadvantage: the reservoir would have flooded the entire Urseren Valley with the villages of Andermatt, Hospenthal and Realp.
The book explores the question of why the Urseren project could not be realized. The dispute over the Urseren power plant was the expression of a crisis of modernization: technical progress was pitted against the love of one's homeland, which was bound up with tradition; the interest of the people of Urseren in preserving their livelihood was pitted against the interest of a secure national supply of electricity. Ultimately, the decisive factor for the failure was the fact that a large-scale technical project that interferes so massively with the interests of others cannot be implemented against the will of those affected.
It looks as if both have learned from history: the locals and the foreign initiators. Sometimes communication works, provided it is handled honestly.
Karl Lüönd is a freelance publicist
* Erich Haag: The Limits of Technology. The resistance against the Urseren power plant project. Chronos Verlag 2004, Zurich
Thomas Matter has lost many millions and his future prospects because he was so sophisticated in business that he did everything wrong in the eyes of the public. Unfortunately, in the context of public opinion, it doesn't matter what any investigation will show one day. And if they would clear him - a stain would remain. The verdict of public opinion (a tortuous term!) knows no possibility of appeal. It is best to do everything right from the beginning. Hopefully Martin Bisang will also get the idea. The only difference between him and Matter is: Matter has already done it.Samih Sawiris, on the other hand, is someone who seems to do everything right. Sawiris is the Egyptian who is going to build the big leisure village in Andermatt. An Egyptian in Switzerland, in these times - that doesn't look like a success story in a country where SVP zealots are already fighting against virtual minarets. All it takes is one wrong move and one devious opponent, and the boy wonder plummets from the top into the bottomless pit, and the value of his company dwindles irrevocably by tens of millions. In the Swissfirst case, it was possible to observe how much the "soft factors" matter today when you have to represent or explain something in public: openness, credibility, plausibility, flexibility. And sensitivity in dealing with dissenters.
The clever Egyptian who wants to invest in the Urseren Valley is, of course, in a more comfortable position than Swissfirst boss Thomas Matter. He doesn't have to defend himself, he's not under fire. But a few other differences are worth noting. Of course, Sawiris also has his high-profile advisors (here, Franz Egle of www.konsulenten.ch., among others). But whenever it becomes important, Sawiris comes himself. He doesn't hide behind any spokesmen, he answers questions personally and in impeccable German, he is tangible and questionable. That makes what he says binding and credible.
Secondly, the man is agile and open for all his single-mindedness. Pro Natura humming in the corner? No problem - I understand! Come, let's sit together. The farmers who should cede land hesitate? Sorry, I understand, we must have gone too fast, sorry! We slow down our schedule and gain three months for additional clarifications.
From this follows, thirdly: The man does not only talk nicely, he also acts accordingly. Fourthly, he may have read a book that has hardly become known beyond the circle of specialist historians, but which is of the greatest importance in the current context*. It describes the history of the Urserenwerk project. Sixty years ago, the same ground in Andermatt was to be submerged for the sake of the electrical industry. And the foreign promoters of the project took a completely different approach. With the corresponding consequences: "We don't negotiate! We do not sell! We don't go!". The resistance of the people of Uri against this large-scale project of the electrical industry was uncompromising and so militant that it culminated in violence against commissioned land buyers and in the well-known Uri riot. It was a full-blown riot with a subsequent trial.
The project for the largest hydroelectric power plant in the Alps had all the technical and energy advantages, but it had one major disadvantage: the reservoir would have flooded the entire Urseren Valley with the villages of Andermatt, Hospenthal and Realp.
The book explores the question of why the Urseren project could not be realized. The dispute over the Urseren power plant was the expression of a crisis of modernization: technical progress was pitted against the love of one's homeland, which was bound up with tradition; the interest of the people of Urseren in preserving their livelihood was pitted against the interest of a secure national supply of electricity. Ultimately, the decisive factor for the failure was the fact that a large-scale technical project that interferes so massively with the interests of others cannot be implemented against the will of those affected.
It looks as if both have learned from history: the locals and the foreign initiators. Sometimes communication works, provided it is handled honestly.
Karl Lüönd is a freelance publicist
* Erich Haag: The Limits of Technology. The resistance against the Urseren power plant project. Chronos Verlag 2004, Zurich
