Agents and principals
Column: Journalists never admit to the consequences of their dual role as both recipients and conveyors of information, according to Stephan Russ-Mohl.
Column Journalists never admit the consequences of their double role as information receiver and mediator.In the traffic between journalists and PR people, information is usually exchanged for attention. When economists analyze such "trades," they pay close attention to information asymmetries. They speak of "principal-agent relationships" whenever business partners are unequally informed about the terms of the deal.One side - the "agent" - usually has far more information and "expert knowledge" regarding the barter transaction than the other side - the "principal." Principals can be not only customers but also superiors. The formative aspect of the relationship results from the knowledge advantage of the agent.
If agents behave in a self-interested manner, they will preferably report positive things to their principals, while covering up failures or shortcomings as far as possible. If this happens across several (hierarchical) levels, a distorted, highly embellished image emerges at the top of an organization - in extreme cases, something like the "Honecker effect": As is well known, the last head of state of the GDR had downright Potemkin villages built by his lackeys to reinforce his belief in the country's economic power and leadership.
Similar information asymmetries also characterize the media business. Journalists can be seen - initially - as principals: They are dependent on information made available to them by public relations professionals as their agents.
Conversely, the publics are the principals of the journalists. Media users have little choice but to trust the news offered to them by their agents in the newsrooms. After all, they learn (almost) everything they know about society, and even about the world they live in, from the mass media.
Journalists hardly ever admit to themselves the consequences for the dissemination of information that result from their dual role as principals and agents. Especially when dealing with complex issues such as health care or pension reform, journalists maintain the fiction that they are independent and well informed. For the public, it remains opaque that journalists also understand much of the information only partially and are unable to judge it.
To round off the picture: PR experts also play dual roles as principals and agents. If they are agents with an information advantage in relation to journalists - and also to their superiors or clients - they slip into the "principal" role when they obtain information from specialist departments within the organization, for example, in order to respond to a press inquiry.
Similarly, publishers or top managers in media companies are the principals of their editors-in-chief, who in turn are the principals of department heads and editors. Conversely, journalists, who usually act as agents within the editorial office, become principals in their dealings with news agencies, but also freelancers.
Some of these principal-agent relationships are cascaded. Thus, a cumulative effect is to be feared. In summary, it can be expected that not only news values and audience desires, but also the self-interests of the various agents and principals determine the output - and thus the distortions, over- and underreporting and ultimately concealed facts in news production.
The "blind spots" in media coverage are not just random blind spots. They are usually the result of self-interested behavior. And it is by no means only the PR people, who are often chided by journalists, who have such self-interests.
Stephan Russ-Mohl heads the European Journalism Observatory at the University of Lugano.
The article is based on a lecture with which the author opened this year's Swiss PR Symposium in Zurich.
If agents behave in a self-interested manner, they will preferably report positive things to their principals, while covering up failures or shortcomings as far as possible. If this happens across several (hierarchical) levels, a distorted, highly embellished image emerges at the top of an organization - in extreme cases, something like the "Honecker effect": As is well known, the last head of state of the GDR had downright Potemkin villages built by his lackeys to reinforce his belief in the country's economic power and leadership.
Similar information asymmetries also characterize the media business. Journalists can be seen - initially - as principals: They are dependent on information made available to them by public relations professionals as their agents.
Conversely, the publics are the principals of the journalists. Media users have little choice but to trust the news offered to them by their agents in the newsrooms. After all, they learn (almost) everything they know about society, and even about the world they live in, from the mass media.
Journalists hardly ever admit to themselves the consequences for the dissemination of information that result from their dual role as principals and agents. Especially when dealing with complex issues such as health care or pension reform, journalists maintain the fiction that they are independent and well informed. For the public, it remains opaque that journalists also understand much of the information only partially and are unable to judge it.
To round off the picture: PR experts also play dual roles as principals and agents. If they are agents with an information advantage in relation to journalists - and also to their superiors or clients - they slip into the "principal" role when they obtain information from specialist departments within the organization, for example, in order to respond to a press inquiry.
Similarly, publishers or top managers in media companies are the principals of their editors-in-chief, who in turn are the principals of department heads and editors. Conversely, journalists, who usually act as agents within the editorial office, become principals in their dealings with news agencies, but also freelancers.
Some of these principal-agent relationships are cascaded. Thus, a cumulative effect is to be feared. In summary, it can be expected that not only news values and audience desires, but also the self-interests of the various agents and principals determine the output - and thus the distortions, over- and underreporting and ultimately concealed facts in news production.
The "blind spots" in media coverage are not just random blind spots. They are usually the result of self-interested behavior. And it is by no means only the PR people, who are often chided by journalists, who have such self-interests.
Stephan Russ-Mohl heads the European Journalism Observatory at the University of Lugano.
The article is based on a lecture with which the author opened this year's Swiss PR Symposium in Zurich.
