Across the Atlantic: Sigmar Gabriel on the US election campaign

m&k: Sigmar Gabriel, as Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, you head an institution that allows an enormously in-depth look at the workings of American politics and society. When you look at the country today, talk to Americans, travel ... what is your impression of the state, of the state of mind in the USA?

Sigmar Gabriel: When we talk about the USA, we must always bear in mind that we cannot draw comparisons with a country like Switzerland or Austria, but rather with a continent like Europe. It is therefore difficult to say: the USA ... the regions, the opinions are enormously different. Unfortunately, this goes hand in hand with the fact that the country has been deeply divided internally for some years now - not only economically, but also politically and culturally, and that is a problem for us as the West as a whole - for us as countries and states that are committed to enlightenment and liberal thinking. The USA is known to be the last leading power to defend the normative West.

 

You just said that the internal division in the USA has existed "for several years". Do you remember moments in the past when you realized that something was changing? Something is changing here - at best before other people were able to recognize it?

About two decades ago, I gave a lecture at the University Club in New York City. At the dinner afterwards, the editor of the International Herald Tribune, now part of the New York Times, sat next to me. We talked a little and I wondered why he seemed so serious. So I asked him. And he answered, quite spontaneously: "I don't recognize my country." The United States of America, he said, was taking a dramatic turn for the worse; and I honestly didn't understand what he meant at all. New York City was the final stop on my trip, we had been to Silicon Valley, I thought everything was fantastic (laughs). Then in 2009, the Tea Party movement emerged, and suddenly you could see that the person I was talking to must have had a dark premonition. In the meantime ... the Republican Party as we knew it - a party that was often even closer to us than the Democrats, with presidents who held their hands in the fire for Europe, for Germany - practically no longer exists. Of course, there are also people who go back much further in these developments than to the formation of the "Tea Party", but that is ultimately a question of interpretation.

"In the meantime (...) the Republican Party as we knew it practically no longer exists."

 

If we want to discuss events of historic proportions, we don't have to go back years - weeks are actually enough: this summer, we have seen many things that have never happened before in this form. We have seen an American president, Joe Biden, drop out of the election campaign relatively shortly before his party's "coronation mass" - and observe how his successor, Kamala Harris, now has to launch her election campaign at the "speed of sound". In your opinion, how did all this come about? And can an election campaign with so little lead time be successful at all?

In terms of Joe Biden's chances of re-election, we first need to look at how he came to office the first time around. Those were very special circumstances: the pandemic wasn't over yet, he was able to campaign from home. And he didn't win the 2020 election by a margin of millions of votes, but mainly by tens of thousands of votes in key swing states. You know the US electoral system: in the end, it comes down to the electoral votes that a candidate can gather behind him or her. Would Biden have won another narrow victory in 2024? Nobody knows. There was also the fear of a "landslide" in which many of his colleagues in the Senate and House of Representatives would also lose their seats - and in the end it all became too risky, it all became too much. It became clear that he would no longer be able to withstand such a stress test. This is not without a certain tragedy, because Biden has a better political record in many areas than Obama; and because people also sympathized with him because of his personal fate. But: it is worthy of all honor that he has taken himself out of the fight for the highest, most powerful office in the world.

 

But an election campaign in three months - with a vice president who has tended to operate behind the scenes and a governor who has yet to gain national recognition - is also a risk, isn't it?

First of all, I would argue that a longer election campaign is not necessarily better - it can also sap your strength, mistakes can happen, the global situation can change. So I think what the Democrats have already achieved is that the race is open again. It would therefore be far too early to make any predictions - Trump can be re-elected, Harris can win. Strategically, I have to say, she is simply the perfect counter-image to him: woman - man, colored - white, prosecutor - defendant (laughs) ... and this conflict creates communication, creates visibility. People have to see clear differences, otherwise nobody will be interested in the election campaign. And Tim Walz ... well, you're right, he hasn't had a national stage yet, but he's also an excellent strategic choice. Again, he is very different from Harris, seems shirt-sleeved, close to the people, yet clear in his convictions. Incidentally, I find it interesting that people often say about him that he "speaks the language of the people" - which implies that politicians generally tend to express themselves in a rather complicated way (laughs). Walz addresses groups of people that Harris may not reach - unlike JD Vance, who is simply a bad copy of Donald Trump. Vance offers no added value in this respect, unlike Mike Pence back then.

 

You yourself decided not to run for chancellor in 2017 - and at the same time resigned from the chairmanship of the Social Democratic Party in Germany. Even if the circumstances were different: Could you also understand Joe Biden's struggle with himself, with his critics, from your experience in top politics?

In this specific case, I believe that people have probably already gone to him - called him - and told him in private: "Watch out, this is going wrong." But that was probably not his inner circle for a long time. In a position like Joe Biden's, you are surrounded by a "bubble" made up of people who all depend on you professionally - and whose power is also called into question if your power wanes. And these people are constantly saying: "You're a great guy, you're doing a great job!" The protagonists in the "bubble" are actually pursuing opportunistic goals, but of course they make it look different. And that probably explains in part why he struggled with himself for so long, even though the pressure from the party and the media was getting stronger and stronger. That's why I just said that the decision he made in the end was very honorable. It takes an almost superhuman objectivity towards yourself to let go of that kind of power. And ideally, you have a few real friends - which are rare in politics, by the way! - and family members who genuinely mean well and who are there to advise, to approach the matter with an open mind. All in all, I think he came out of it all right. There are much worse processes in politics - which I also had to experience in the SPD, first-hand and with others - where the knives are sharpened behind your back and as soon as you're out the door, they're tinkering with the end of your career. Politics is always capable of bringing out the best in people ... or the worst.

"People need to see clear differences, otherwise no one will be interested in the election campaign."

 

The media like to simplify - "Trump would be bad, Harris would be good" is the dominant narrative in reporting in German-speaking countries when it comes to the upcoming US elections. I have to admit that I feel the same way myself, but are we making things too easy for ourselves with this narrative?

Yes, we are making it far too easy for ourselves. For some time now, we have only been discussing the question of who will sit in the Oval Office - and of course there are big differences: Kamala Harris believes that the USA still needs allies in the 21st century, while Donald Trump thinks this is all a load of garbage. He sees himself as a "dealmaker"; he believes that the big boys sit around a table and determine world affairs ... while the others have to see how they get on. There is a lot at stake for Europe when it comes to the question of how willing the USA is to compromise and negotiate ... and the narrative you described probably still applies here. But what too many people fail to see is that the US - whether with Trump or Harris - is increasingly shifting its attention to the Indo-Pacific. No matter who moves into the White House, this is a trend that will continue. That's why the US wants to be relieved in Europe and Africa, wants us to take on more tasks. The situation might have been different if the Germans and Austrians hadn't made the huge mistake of torpedoing the free trade agreement with the Americans that was possible a few years ago ... a small window was open there, but it has long since closed again. That would have ensured stronger, lasting ties.

 

You say that the future US administration would expect us to provide relief in Europe and Africa - regardless of whether Donald Trump or Kamala Harris wins the election. What expectations would the US have of Europe when it comes to its relationship with China?

I am very sure that Washington will demand that Europe enters into a much tougher conflict with China - which is a major problem for us. This is fundamentally different from Russia, from which we have sourced natural gas and oil, but which we are otherwise far superior to economically. China, on the other hand, is in many ways on a par with the European Union, and in some respects even ahead of it. A kind of ... "frenemy", an economic partner, but a political opponent. For the USA, cooperation with China is far less important than it is for us, which is why Washington focuses primarily on the rivalry for global supremacy. And of course it is not appreciated if we forge close economic ties with Beijing. To put it bluntly, we run the risk of economic relations with China one day becoming a "new Nordstream 2".

 

It all sounds as if Europe is heading for troubled times.

Yes, because we are at the end of a period that was characterized by the hope of globalization, free trade and the reduction of political conflicts. What follows now is uncertain. Instead of more peace, we are experiencing more war; instead of more cooperation, we are seeing the return of protectionism. This is a paradox in itself, because there have never been so many challenges that could only be solved by working together - but international politics and reality are heading in opposite directions. A kind of "North-South divide" has also emerged, in which the global South no longer accepts the North's claim to leadership. When we arrive and ask for support in the fight against Russia in Ukraine, we are told: "Aha, now we are supposed to help - but if 100,000 people die in our country because a war breaks out or there is a famine, then you don't care." Many leaders in the region in question don't like what's happening in Eastern Europe either - they don't want to be dominated by China or Russia either - but they are exercising restraint. We will have to discuss how we deal with this with the USA; it will demand a lot from us.

 

As an experienced foreign policy expert, I would like to ask you to comment on another popular narrative: Is Donald Trump really the isolationist he is generally described as?

I'm not sure if the term applies to him. Look, he really gets involved, he just does it ... differently. There is one constant with him that can also reassure us: Despite all his rhetoric, he hasn't started a war in four years in office. I remember how he used to talk about North Korea. He wanted to rain "fire and fury" on the country. What did he do in the end? He went there and met with the dictator. Nothing came of it, but at least it wasn't what many had feared. Or in 2019, when Iran targeted the Saudi oil industry with cruise missiles and drones - some officials in Saudi Arabia were probably hoping that the allied USA would "really show Iran". An Iranian general in Iraq was then specifically targeted, and that was that. Trump is skeptical when it comes to the use of the military; he has already - of all things! - said in a "Playboy" interview in the 1980s that he feared the escalation potential of conflicts between nuclear-armed states. But he is definitely partisan, he instigates trade wars ... the term "isolationist" therefore falls short for me. And another thing: politicians who oppose the deployment of American troops abroad can also be found on the left of the political spectrum. Bernie Sanders is a good example.

 

Do you think Donald Trump would leave NATO if he wins the election in November?

No. He can't. The vast majority of the American people - and the political leadership across both major parties - are in favor of NATO. But he doesn't have to leave in order to damage the alliance. Even the doubts that he repeatedly expresses can act as an invitation to someone like Vladimir Putin and thus cause enormous damage.

 

So you don't believe that Putin will stop once the war in Ukraine is over?

I am one of those people who have been wrong once about Russia and Vladimir Putin's policies - I would hate to make that mistake a second time. I used to believe that we would find a way to get along with him, but he obviously has the idea that he has to lead Russia back to its "old greatness". This is not just the Soviet Union, this is the Tsarist Empire ... and a successful, modern, democratic Ukraine in the immediate neighborhood does not fit into his concept. So he wages war. Putin sees that the world is in upheaval. He sees that the order we established after the Second World War is breaking down. And he wants to act as the representative of a superpower - not as the boss of an oil and gas station. That is his motive.

 

A few months ago, I spoke with A. Michael Spence, an American Nobel laureate in economics. Together with your former colleague Gordon Brown and the economist Mohamed El-Erian, he has written a book about the perma-crises of the present day and in our conversation he pleaded for us to "jump back and forth between the ice floes of our time as best we can". Pure pragmatism, in other words. But he also told me that Gordon Brown always contradicted him - you have to be idealistic, he said, and set up new institutions for international cooperation. What do you tend to do?

I simply wonder what kind of institutions they should be? We in Europe would do well not to rely on any structures that could end up failing, but to make ourselves strong wherever possible. I don't mean this primarily in military terms, although that is constantly being discussed ... but it will be a long time before we are in a position to defend ourselves. However, we have something else from which we can generate self-confidence: our economic power, our ability to innovate, an internal market that can be expanded further. We do not need to chase after the illusion that we will become "the United States of Europe", at least not in our lifetime ...

"It takes an almost superhuman objectivity towards yourself to let go of that kind of power."

 

... why not? That would be a nice idea.

I think that's a pretty far-fetched discussion. You won't be able to explain to the Poles why they fought for an autonomous nation state for two hundred years, and suddenly the good news of the week is supposed to be: "We're abolishing it in favor of Brussels!" That won't work. But we can do more among ourselves, with each other. We should make full use of Europe's - realistic - potential and stick together as best we can.

 

Do you think reforms of international institutions - such as the UN Security Council - are feasible?

Yes, but I would like to come back to the global South. The Security Council reflects the structures that prevailed after the end of the Second World War. There are permanent members like Great Britain and France - but no one from Africa, Latin America or India. That is absurd! When the UN Security Council met for the first time, these countries were seen as the "Third World", they were colonized ... it is absolutely understandable to me that they now want to have a greater say in international institutions. If this say is guaranteed, then perhaps the institutions will function better again.

 

Mr. Gabriel, two final questions: What makes you pessimistic at the moment? And what makes you optimistic?

What makes me pessimistic is the feeling that the world seems to have lost the memory of what wars mean; what the Second World War meant. You almost get the impression that in many corners of the world the next conflict is almost being wished for. I find what is happening in the Middle East terrible. The way in which a really big war is being ignited there is also terrible, as is the brutality with which Russia is waging war against Ukraine. What makes me optimistic is the experience of the European Union: so far, it is the only example in the world where bitter enmity and genocide have been turned into partnership and friendship in less than a generation - actually unimaginable! We have gone from, to use a metaphor, Auschwitz to Brussels in less than a lifetime. That shows what people are capable of when they really want something and when they have courageous political leaders. I don't think that after the Second World War everyone was enthusiastic about accepting the Germans - who had just been murdering and pillaging their way through the country - back into the society of civilized states. There will have been a lot of skepticism, but there were also politicians who were optimistic and to whom we owe decades of peace in the end. My hope is that this will also be possible in other parts of the world.

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Sigmar Gabriel is a former German politician and current advisor and publicist. He was Federal Chairman of the SPD from November 2009 to March 2017 and Vice-Chancellor from December 2013 to March 2018. He has also held several ministerial posts, including German Foreign Minister. Since 2019, he has been Chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, which is committed to German-American cooperation in business and society.

 

This article first appeared in the m&k print edition 8-9/2024.